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Security is a key component for information technologies and
communication.
Even if an algorithm is securely designed, it may be vulnerable
to physical attacks.
There are two families attacks.
There are two goals for an physical attacks.
We present a common formalism for all physical attacks.
Our idea is that the formalism is a guide to compare physical
attacks.
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Plan
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Physical Attack
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Physical Attack
Side Channel // Fault Injection attacks
Physical attacks can be divided in two families.
The side channel attacks consist in observing some physical
characteristics which are modiﬁed during the computation
performed on the circuit.
The fault injection attacks consist in disrupting the circuit
behaviour.
New attacks mix the two families.
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Physical Attack
Diﬀerent Goals
1 Find the cipher key.
2 Reverse-engineering
Although Kerckhoﬀs' principle, private algorithms are still used.
Creating a strong new cryptosystem from scratch is not easy.
These algorithms respect some properties identical to
algorithm which has gained one's spurs.
When the goal of an attacker is to retrieve information on a
private algorithm, his attack is termed reverse engineering.
Customized s-boxes.
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Why a formalism ?
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Why a formalism ?
The present formalism is described for cryptographic cipher at
secret key.
Several works have been proposed to described them with a
common formalism [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
These works only cover side channel attacks or physical
attacks but not the two families.
This paper proposes a framework which is common to both
fault injection and side channel attacks.
To reverse an algorithm or to ﬁnd the key can be described in
the same way.
Formalism is described in 3 steps.
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Why a formalism ?
A formalism to compare them all,
A formalism to combine them,
A formalism to ﬁnd them all,
And in the classical cryptanalysis bind them ...
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Measurements
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Measurements
The ﬁrst stage in these attacks is to collect data called
observables.
The target noted k is the secret found by the attacker.
Two set of observables Or and Os of size n must be collected
in experiments.
Some examples of observables : cipher-text, faulty cipher-text,
EM traces, power traces...
The exploitable relation R or attack path links Os and Or at
the target k .
This relation is composed by physical functions fi and some
algorithm composed functions gi .
R = f1 ◦ g1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn ◦ gn
In fault injection attacks physical function are called error
functions and leakage functions in side channel attacks
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Predictions
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Predictions
1 Make guesses hk on the target.
A small part of the target is selected to have a divide and
conquer approach.
2 The physical function does not have mathematical written.
Take again R and replace the physical functions fi by models
mj .
R ′M = m1 ◦ g1 ◦ · · · ◦mn ◦ gn
3 For each hk , and each set M of models m, compute PM(k).
R ′M(hk ,Os) = PM(k)
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Confrontation
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Confrontation
PM(k) and Or are considered as random variables.
For each hk , PM(k) is confronted with respect to Or with a a
statistic tool called distinguisher.




Linear dependency Diﬀerence of mean
Pearson correlation
Information of Shannon Entropy
Mutual Information
Inter-class and intra-class variances Principal Component
Linear Discriminant
A Formalism for Physical Attacks Le Bouder 09/26/13 15/1
Algorithms
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Algorithms
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
Established by the NIST [?]
Transform the plain-text M of 128 bits into a
two-dimensional array 4 · 4
Based on substitution and permutation.
10 rounds composed by :
SubByte : a boolean function 8→ 8, noted
SB.
ShiftRow : a rotation operation on each
row, noted SR.
MixColumn : a linear transformation in
GF (28) at columns, noted MC .
AddRoundKey : ⊕ round key.
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Algorithms
DES Data Encrytption Standard
Established by the NIST [?]
A symmetric cryptosystem, speciﬁcally a 16-round
Feistel cipher.
Starts by IP, a permutation of 64 bits and ﬁnishes by
its inverse IP−1.
The round function F on 32 bits consists in 4 steps.
Expansion E which maps 32 bits in 48 bits
by duplicating half of the bits.
⊕ with the 48 bits of round key Kj ,
j ∈ [[1, 16]].
8 S-boxes Si : boolean functions 6→ 4
Permutation P of 32 bits.
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Example of side channel attacks
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Example of side channel attacks
Power or EM traces
K = k0, the target is byte of the key at round 0.
There are only 256 possible values.
Os = M plain text.
Or = em or power is the power consumption or the
emission of an electromagnetic ﬁeld.
R = f ◦ g
with : f = EM emission of electromagnetic ﬁeld or
f = Pow power consumption and g = SB ◦ ⊕.
R ′ = m ◦ g
withm = HW or m = HD
The distinguisher can be a diﬀerence of mean [?], a
correlation [?], a mutual information [?], a principal
component [?] or a linear discriminant [?].
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Example of fault injection attacks
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Example of fault injection attacks
Classic Diﬀerential analysis
K = k10, the target is a byte of the key at round 10.
There are only 256 possible values.
Os = C , the cipher text.
Or = C
∗the faulty cipher text.
R = g2 ◦ f ◦ g1
with : f =single-bit fault injection and
g1 =SB
−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ ⊕
g2 = ⊕ ◦ SR ◦ SB.
R ′ = g2 ◦mi ◦ g1
with mi = ⊕2i , i ∈ [[0, 7]].
The distinguisher is a sieve [?] or a counter [?].
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Example of Hybrid attacks
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Example of Hybrid attacks
Fault Sentivity Analysis [?]
K = k10 , the target is a byte of the key at round 10.
There are only 256 possible values.
Os = C
∗ the faulty cipher text.
Or = I the sensitivity to the fault.
R = f ◦ g
with f = Stress which triggers the fault and
g = SB−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ ⊕
R ′ = m ◦ g
with m = HW .
The distinguisher is a correlation.
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Example of Reverse Engineering
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Example of Reverse Engineering
FIRE [?]
The target is an s-box of a DES-like cryptosystem i.e a
boolean function noted S(m) = y . To have a divide and
conquer approach the target is just a diﬀerential at the
output. K = S(m)⊕ S(m∗) = ∆y
There are only 15 possible values.
Os = Left(IP(C
∗ ⊕ C)) = L16⊕ L16∗ the left part of the
diﬀerential between the faulty cipher text and the cipher
text in IP.
Or = Right(IP(C
∗ ⊕ C)) = R16∗ ⊕ R16 the right part of
the diﬀerential between the faulty cipher text and the cipher
text in IP.
R = g ◦ f
with : f =single-bit fault injection and g = P ◦ (⊕K16) ◦ E .
R ′ = g ◦mi
with mi = ⊕2i , i ∈ [[0, 5]].
The distinguisher is a sieve.
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Example of Reverse Engineering
SCARE [?]
The target is an s-box of a DES-like cryptosystem i.e
a boolean function 6→ 4, S(m) = y . To have a
divide and conquer approach the target is cut in
boolean functions 2→ 1. Masks are used at the
output and at the input to realize this cut. K = f2→1
There are only 16 possible values.
Os = Left(IP(C)) = (L16),the left part of the cipher
text in IP.
Or = power , the power consummation at the output
of the s-box in the round 16.
R = f ◦ g
with f = Pow power consumption and
g = (⊕K16) ◦ E .
R ′ = m ◦ g withm = HW
The distinguisher is a correlation.
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Thank you for your attention
Do you have any questions ?
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